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Sovereign wealth funds are entities regarded as an institutional innovation in the international fi-
nancial market. Due to the nature of the ownership rights, the investment activity of such entities 
is still highly controversial. Objections against sovereign wealth funds included the alleged extra-
economic goals of their activity. 
This article attempts to show that the establishment development and operation of sovereign 
wealth funds are determined by economic factors. The study presents a description of the interna-
tional monetary system and the motives for building foreign exchange reserves by countries. It has 
been evidenced on the basis of the most recent data that some countries have reserves consider-
ably exceeding the level regarded as optimal for the economy. The article presents benefits for the 
economy from the use of sovereign wealth funds to manage excessive foreign exchange reserves.
Introduction
Sovereign wealth funds are state-owned entities, the 
basic task of which consists in the allocation of the 
country’s financial reserves. These entities are regarded 
as an institutional innovation in the international fi-
nancial market. As opposed to the policy of investing 
foreign exchange reserves conducted by central banks, 
a policy assuming a low risk and a low return rate as 
well as a narrow range of assets purchased, sovereign 
wealth funds implement investment strategies aimed 
at  achieving  higher  return  rates  than  before  with  a 
simultaneous  acceptance  of  higher  risk  connected 
with it. Moreover, investment activity conducted by 
these entities in domestic and international markets 
significantly diversifies the asset portfolio, into which 
currency reserves of a given country are transferred. 
Global  activity  of  sovereign  wealth  funds,  which  is 
conducted on a large scale and combined with the lack 
of even basic information about the operation of these 
entities, on numerous occasions lead to a situation, in 
which the activity of sovereign wealth funds is often 
perceived from the angle of political goals. On behalf 
of the countries,  these entities may fulfil have been 
established.
The aim of this study is to present the economic 
conditions of the establishment and development of 
the sovereign wealth funds. This article is aimed at 
disputing the claim that the establishment and activ-
ity of these entities are motivated by extra-economic 
conditions, which constitutes one of the fundamental 
objections brought forward against these entities. The 
discussion will present the influence of key macroeco-
nomic factors determining the development of such 
funds, which, in the author’s opinion, should include 
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the specificity of the present-day international foreign 
exchange market, the globalisation of markets, espe-
cially  of  financial  ones  and  its  consequences  in  the 
event of crises and the implementation of the strategy 
of export-driven economic growth. 
1.  The  Establishment  and  Evolution 
of the International Foreign Exchange 
System
The necessity of taking a closer look on the interna-
tional  monetary  system  established  in  1944  results 
from  the  fact  that  the  present-day  global  financial 
system  –  within  which  the  sovereign  wealth  funds 
under analysis conduct their activity – is built on the 
same logical structure. It assumes the function of in-
ternational finance based on one dominating reserve 
foreign currency, i.e. the dollar and the resulting con-
sequences  for  both  the  country  issuing  the  reserve 
currency and for the rest of the world.  It also deter-
mines the function of sovereign wealth funds in the 
international market, which, despite being regarded as 
an institutional innovation in the global financial mar-
ket, conduct their activity according to the restrictions 
and principles of the present-day international foreign 
exchange system. 
As K. Nędzyński proves, the Bretton Woods system 
established in 1944 was supposed to create the founda-
tions for free trade and monetary stability, while at the 
same time preventing the use of interventionism. The 
concept of foreign exchange rates, according to which 
currencies  would  be  exchanged  at  fixed  rates,  was 
best suited to achieve these goals. The Bretton Woods 
Agreement legally sanctioned the dollar position as the 
reserve currency for the entire world monetary system. 
The stability of the reserve currency was to be ensured 
by its fixed connection with gold, which according to 
the parity, was 35 USD per ounce (Nędzyński, 2003:10-
11). All the other countries were obliged to keep the ex-
change rate of their currency within the 1% limit of the 
declared parity against the dollar. As it was argued by 
Dam, the world financial system established in Bretton 
Woods was like a solar system, in which the American 
dollar played the role of the sun (D`Arista, 2009: 639; 
Hall, Hondroyiannis, Swamy & Tavlas, 2009: 4-5).
The asymmetry of the financial order constructed 
in  this  way  had  several  sources.  Firstly,  the  United 
States became the only creator of the reserve currency 
for  the  entire  international  financial  system,  which 
determined the amount of the reserve currency, the 
world price and inflation levels. Secondly, the issuer 
of the reserve currency was de facto released from the 
obligation to intervene in the dollar exchange market; 
therefore, such interventions had to be undertaken by 
other  countries,  while  the  reserve  currency  issuer’s 
role was to ensure its liquidity.  Thirdly, the right to 
dollar-gold conversion was assigned only to govern-
mental institutions. In this way, the financial system of 
the rest of the world lost the possibility of sending eco-
nomic signals to the reserve currency issuer’s country, 
which would review its monetary policy implemented 
at a given time. In the original version of the Bretton 
Woods system, as it is argued by Costabile, gold consti-
tuted an anchor, with which the reserve currency – the 
dollar – was connected. This imposed the necessity of 
maintaining discipline as regards the external balance 
on the issuer, at least to some extent. It remains debat-
able how far these restrictions occurred in practice, as 
a view can be found in the literature that, in fact. until 
1971 the dollar could not be exchanged for gold pursu-
ant to a gentlemen’s agreement (Costabile, 2009: 83). 
Despite the afore-mentioned construction errors, the 
system operated without major reservations. The dol-
lar was perceived as a stable currency by the economies 
of Western Europe and Japan that rose after the war 
and the United States accepted the imbalance in trade 
exchange between the USA and its allies. This situation 
was dubbed “favourable imbalance”. Problems became 
apparent when it turned out that countries began to 
prefer payments in gold rather than in dollars for their 
excess exports to the USA (Nędzyński, 2003:14-17).
To improve the international financial system and 
to reduce the inequalities in trade exchange, numerous 
actions were taken, which, however, did not stabilise 
the system, as they were not capable of balancing the 
excessively  expansive  monetary  policy  implemented 
by the USA. This policy could not be reconciled with 
the principles of the world’s financial order established 
in Bretton Woods. Only as a result of the Jamaica Ac-
cord signed by the member countries of the Interna-
tional  Monetary  Fund  in  1976,  new  arrangements 
became effective, which shaped the architecture of the 
world finance for decades. This agreement sanctioned 
floating exchange rates and the selection of the specific 
method for the foreign exchange rate management was 44 D. Urban
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left at the individual countries’ discretion.  However, 
the lack of a defined and commonly accepted reserve 
currency introduced a new risk into the world’s mon-
etary system. The system of collective reserve curren-
cies – despite the fact that the majority of the coun-
tries still chose the dollar – forced the countries to 
increase their foreign exchange reserves significantly 
(Fig. 1.). They became a method of coping with for-
eign exchange fluctuations and external imbalances. 
A particularly distinct increase in the reserves, which 
usually had the form of government bonds, occurred 
in developing countries and in rising markets (Ping & 
Chao, 2009: 8-11).
Visco pinpoints that the international monetary sys-
tem, which has been in operation since the suspension 
of dollar for gold exchangeability (the actual fall of the 
Bretton Woods system), is not really a system, but the 
outcome of open preferences of individual countries as 
regards the foreign exchange rate, with very small or 
virtually absent international supervision at the same 
time.  The  regime  of  fixed  exchange  rates  has  never 
been replaced with a system of floating rates, and what 
we have now can be considered a hybrid solution. In 
practice, most countries’ foreign exchange policy has 
been characterised by fear of fluctuations and the re-
sultant high level of foreign exchange interventions for 
the past 35 years (Visco, 2010: 74-75). A description of 
the currently applicable agreements in the area of in-
ternational finance as a non-systemic solution can also 
be found in the latest studies by employees of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (Mateos y Lago, Duttagupta 
& Goyal, 2009: 5). 
A different point of view on the operation of the 
present-day international monetary system is present-
ed by Dooley, Folkers-Landau & Garber (Dooley Folk-
erts-Landau & Garber, 2004; Dooley, Folkerts-Landau 
& Garber, 2009). Namely, they suggest that the system 
of  current  agreements  and  connections  in  the  area 
of foreign exchange rates is a simple continuation of 
the Bretton Woods system – to distinguish it from the 
original system, they call it Bretton Woods II or the re-
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vived Bretton Woods. They prove that just like during 
the post-war years, asymmetry between the centre and 
peripheral economies also occurs today.  According 
to this hypothesis, to keep the growth strategy based 
on exports, peripheral countries keep their currencies 
below their actual market value (by controlling capital 
flows and by fixed exchange rates), thus accumulating 
enormous foreign exchange reserves. These reserves 
mostly  have  the  form  of  USA  low-interest  treasury 
bonds. In  this case,  the  costs of  accumulating  such 
reserves are smaller than the benefits from adopting 
such a developmental strategy (Hall, Hondroyiannis, 
Swamy & Tavlas, 2009: 10). As it is argued by Dooley, 
Folkers-Landau & Garber, this system is transitional, 
supported and it is still evolving as with time, another 
group of countries, that is “aspiring for being periph-
eral”, will emerge and they will follow the previously 
established pattern (Dooley Folkerts-Landau & Gar-
ber, 2004: 308).
In summary, it needs to be emphasised that the pres-
ent shape of world monetary agreements inevitably gen-
erates imbalance, which is manifested by a huge deficit 
in the United States, on the one hand, and accumulation 
of unprecedented amounts of foreign exchange reserves 
in developing countries, on the other hand. 
2.  Motives  for  Building  Foreign  Ex-
change Reserves 
The motives for accumulating ever larger foreign ex-
change reserves are also caused by reasons other than 
the specificity of the international financial system. Grif-
fith-Jones & Ocampo define four basic motives respon-
sible for the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves: 
the wealth substitution motive, the resilient surplus mo-
tive, the counter-cyclical motive and the self-insurance 
motive (Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, 2010: 14-18).
The first motive concerns countries with abundant 
natural resources and is connected with the surplus re-
sulting from the extraction and sales of these resourc-
es. The accumulation of reserves in this case is a form 
of exchanging one form of assets - natural resources 
for  another  form  characterised  by  greater  liquidity. 
In the case of lack of reserves, the surplus created in 
this way would be allocated to domestic investment 
projects or consumed. The consumption of raw mate-
rials undermines the legitimacy of their exploitation, 
while investing in the domestic market may result in 
the Dutch disease (also called the resource curse or the 
Paradox of Plenty). Reserves of a given country allow 
for geographic diversification, which can ensure a con-
stant growth also when the revenues from the sales of 
natural resources decrease. 
The  second  motive  results  from  the  permanent 
structural surplus in trade exchange, which is achieved 
by some countries implementing the policy of keeping 
the exchange rate of their currency below its market 
value, which makes it possible for them to be competi-
tive compared to other trade partners. Because of the 
lack of exchange rate, which would ensure proper bal-
ance, this surplus is “resistant” to both the advancing 
economic growth (and the growing inclination to im-
ports) and the slow, crawling appreciation of the for-
eign exchange rate. It is true that a violent increase in 
the foreign exchange rate in these countries may first 
result in the surplus reduction, but at the subsequent 
stage, it may lead to recession, a reduction in the de-
mand for imported goods, an increase in savings and 
the occurrence of speculative bubbles in various class-
es of assets in the domestic market. Japan in the 1980s 
is an example of such a chronology of events. 
The counter-cyclical motive for having reserves as-
sumes their accumulation under conditions of surplus, 
which is most frequently accompanied by periods of 
economic growth and their use during periods of low-
er economic activity in a given country. Fluctuations 
of both prices in world markets and changes in the 
economic activity of commercial partners may be the 
source of such a cyclical development. In both cases, 
this may result in overheating of the economy under 
boom  conditions  and  the  resultant  inflation  in  the 
domestic market and the appreciation of the nominal 
foreign exchange rate and, finally, appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. 
The self-insurance motive for accumulation of re-
serves by developing countries is based on the convic-
tion that the foreign capital flow to these countries is 
characterised by cyclicity, and thus, these countries are 
exposed to the risk of capital outflow. The higher the 
fluctuations in the capital flow are and the more open a 
given economy is, the higher the risk is. It particularly 
applies to emerging markets, in which the progressing 
cash flow liberalisation was characterised by the oc-
currence of a series of economic and financial crises 
called sudden stops. They were characterised by a sud-46 D. Urban
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den stop of foreign capital inflow to a given economy 
and/or a simultaneous strong capital outflow from this 
economy. Nearly 100 cases of sudden stops have been 
identified in the past 25 years and the average costs in-
curred by the affected economy for this reason have 
been estimated at approx. 10% GDP (Hutchison, Noy 
& Wang, 2010: 973-974).
A significant increase in the reserves of these coun-
tries is perceived as a form of protecting the country 
against  the  potential  crisis  (Table  1).  Realizing  that 
the loss of access to financial markets is a drawback of 
financial globalisation and that financial tools, which 
can be used in the case of a sudden stop of the capital 
inflow (or its violent outflow), are limited, these coun-
tries treat these reserves as a kind of war chest (Durdu, 
Mendoza  &  Torrenes,  2009:  194).  An  increase  in  a 
country’s financial liquidity by accumulation of for-
eign exchange reserves is this country’s self-insurance 
mechanism in the event of crises in world markets (Al-
faro & Kanchuk, 2009: 23). 
Country
Year of crisis 
occurrence
Foreign exchange reserves as GDP %
Before the crisis (from 
1985 to the year preceding 
the crisis)
After the crisis (from the 
year after the crisis to the 
year 2004)
Change in the 
reserve level
Argentina
1994  3.20 8.65 +5.42
2001 5.04 11.54 +6.51
Brazil 1998 4.36 7.65 +3.30
Chile 1998 16.93 20.49 +3.57
Columbia  1998 9.42 12.21 +2.97
Ecuador 1999 7.35 3.89 -3.46
Hong-Kong 1998 34.16 68.85 +34.69
Indonesia 1997 6.53 18.69 +12.17
South Korea 1997 5.03 21.26 +16.23
Mexico 1994 4.64 7.29 +2.65
Malaysia 1997 25.18 39.54 +14.36
Pakistan 1998 1.90 8.51 +6.61
Peru 1998 9.25 16.66 +7.41
Philippines 1997 6.05 16.69 +10.65
Russia 1998 3.05 12.46 +9.41
Thailand 1997 14.84 28.01 +13.17
Turkey 2001 5.67 13.57 +7.90
Uruguay 2002 7.18 20.06 +12.87
Table 1. Mean values of the characteristics of the countries investigated and the test for equality of means
Source: Durdu, Mendoza & Terrones, 2009: 195.Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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The self-insurance motive for the accumulation of 
reserves is connected with the phenomenon of adjust-
ing the reserve level in a group of countries. The issue 
of the influence of the foreign exchange reserve level 
accumulated by the adjacent countries on the level of 
the reserves accumulated by a given economy was first 
touched upon by Fritz Machlup (1966). He compared 
the behaviour of economies in this respect to the be-
haviour of his wife regarding the accumulation of new 
clothes in her wardrobe: the appearance of a neighbour 
wearing new clothes each time conditioned subsequent 
purchases of clothes by his wife. As regards economies, 
the Machlup hypothesis (keep up with the Joneses, Mrs. 
Machlup wardrobe hypothesis) means that the target 
level of a country’s foreign exchange level is influenced 
by the size of reserves accumulated by the adjacent coun-
tries. The latest empirical verification of this hypothesis 
was presented by Cheueng & Sengupta. They proved 
that in the years 1980-2007, the level of foreign exchange 
reserves accumulated by countries, such as Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela, can be accounted for (apart 
from other variables) by the phenomenon of adjusting 
the reserves of a given country to the reserve level in 
the region (Cheung & Sengupta, 2010). Similar studies 
confirmed the occurrence of the afore-mentioned phe-
nomenon among a group of Asian countries (Cheung & 
Qian, 2009), including China, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan 
and Thailand. The authors provided an empirical confir-
mation that the level of foreign exchange reserves in the 
years 1980-2004 was adjusted to their general level in 
the group. The appearance of an additional dollar in the 
form of reserves from one of the countries resulted in an 
increase of the foreign exchange reserves in the group by 
60 cents. This effect was even stronger during the period 
following the Asian crisis, i.e. after 1997. 
Another factor responsible for the increase in the 
global reserve level is the application of growth strate-
gies based on exports. According to this concept the 
accumulation of reserves by some Asian countries is a 
by-product of this kind of growth strategy. However, as 
Aizenman & Lee (2007) pointed out, this factor deter-
mining the size of foreign exchange reserves is weaker 
than the demand caused by the self-insurance motives. 
The research conducted by Eichengreen & Raco-
Garcia showed that a further increase in the capital 
mobility and a rise in capital flow connected with it. 
This  will  result  in  more  countries  abandoning  the 
unstable foreign exchange rate mechanisms (various 
types of floating exchange rates and soft variations of 
fixed exchange rates) to adopt floating exchange rates 
(Eichengreen & Raco-Garcia, 2006: 416). This can fur-
ther enhance the tendency towards accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves by countries. 
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The data presented in Fig. 2 prove that in the group 
of countries under analysis, an increase in the value 
of the accumulated reserves is taking place.  The fact 
that the nine countries mentioned below held 62% of 
the global reserves in 2009 deserves to be emphasised, 
which shows a significant concentration of this phe-
nomenon. China is the leader in this area (the right-
hand  side  in  the  figure),  as  it  holds  twice  as  much 
foreign exchange reserves than Japan, which is ranked 
second. A similar scale of disproportion occurs be-
tween Japan and Russia and Saudi Arabia, which fol-
low it in the ranking.
In summary, it must be stressed that the motives 
for  accumulating  foreign  exchange  reserves  can  be 
basically divided into two groups. The first of these 
includes self-insurance, precautionary motives, which 
come down to treating reserves as a specific form of 
insurance of a country participating in the global eco-
nomic system against the risk induced by such a devel-
opmental strategy. The other group, on the other hand, 
encompasses  competitive,  mercantile  motives  where 
reserves are used for the achievement of economic ob-
jectives – to achieve the competitiveness of exports.
3. Models of Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Due to the differences occurring between economies, 
there is no index, which would precisely describe the 
optimal or sufficient levels of reserves which should 
be  accumulated  by  a  given  country.  The  following 
measures concerning the appropriate reserve level an 
economy should have are commonly accepted and the 
most frequently mentioned in the literature on foreign 
exchange reserves (Green & Torgerson, 2007: 3):
•	 Reserves	 in	 relation	 to	 short-term	 debt	 or	 the	
Greenspan-Guidotti  rule.  According  to  this  ap-
proach, the size of reserves in developing countries 
should make it possible to cover the debt with the 
debt  repayment  time  limits  shorter  than  a  year. 
At the same time, this is the most frequently used 
indicator of an economy’s sensitivity to a foreign 
exchange crisis.
•	 Reserves	in	relation	to	the	monetary	aggregate	M2.	
In the approach proposed by Wijnholds & Kapteyn, 
M2 depends on the foreign exchange regime, the 
level of reserves considered to be appropriate for a 
country ranges from 5 to 20%. The justification of 
the use of this point of view is an economy’s sen-
sitivity to capital withdrawal and the trust to the 
local currency value can be measured by the mon-
etary reference to the level of reserves. 
•	 Reserves	to	the	size	of	imports.	The	index	consid-
ered to be optimal for countries with the low income 
level and at the same time, those without full access 
to international capital markets. The most frequently 
quoted reference level is the level of reserves making 
it possible to cover three months of exports.
•	 Foreign	exchange	reserves	to	GDP.	This	measure	is	
the least economically justified, as the gross domes-
tic product is not a measure of risk, which could 
take place in the case of crisis. Therefore, there are 
no grounds to compare the level of reserves to the 
gross national product in a given country.
On the basis of the data presented in Fig. 3, it can be 
concluded that in the analysed countries, the level of 
the reserves they had accumulated did not exceed the 
level of total external debt in 2008. Brazil is the only 
exception here, where the foreign exchange reserves to 
total debt ratio was at the level of 76% in the last year of 
the analysis. It shows that the reserve level defined by 
the Greenspan-Guidotti rule was significantly exceed-
ed. In the case of Algeria (the scale on the right-hand 
side of the diagram), the reserves are 27 times higher 
than this country’s current total debt. The data present-
ed in Fig. 4, on the other hand, prove that, except for 
Russia in 1999, the reserves of all countries exceeded 
the reference level defined by the value of three months 
of imports in the period under analysis (market with a 
dotted line in the diagram). Saudi Arabia’s foreign ex-
change reserves were sufficient to cover the equivalent 
of 28 months of imports in 2008.
 Beck & Fidora made an attempt to assess the size 
of excessive reserves accumulated by various countries 
in 2007. In the method which they adopted, they de-
termined the excessive reserve level as the difference 
between the total reserves and one of the two values 
considered to be the benchmark: three months of im-
port value or the short-term debt value. According to 
their calculations, the global value of excessive foreign 
exchange reserves accumulated in the world’s econo-
my in 2007 is at the level of 3023 billion USD (Beck & 
Fidora, 2008: 14). 
Keeping excessive reserves by developing countries 
is expensive for two reasons. Firstly, these funds could Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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be  allocated  to  more  effective  investment  projects. 
Secondly, the occurrence of the alternative cost is con-
nected with holding reserves. Assuming that a given 
country has external debt, the difference between the 
rate, at which funds are borrowed in international mar-
kets, and the return rate achieved from the allocation 
of reserves, represents the cost of lost opportunities, 
which is incurred by a given economy in connection 
with keeping the reserves (Akdogan, 2010: 3). The cost 
of keeping excessive reserves by developing countries 
was estimated by Rodrick at the level of one percentage 
point of the GDP (Rodrick, 2006: 9). In the context of 
the costs of keeping excessive reserves, it needs to be 
mentioned that the competition of countries in accu-
Figure 3. The level of foreign exchange reserves in selected countries in relation to the total external debt in the years 
1999-2008 (in %)
Figure 4. The relation of the total foreign exchange reserve value to the monthly imports in selected countries in the 
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mulating foreign exchange reserves accounted for by 
Machlup leads to an increase in the demand for these 
reserves over the level, which can be explained in terms 
of economic factors. The consequence of such a strate-
gy of competition between the countries is an increase 
in the costs incurred by these countries in connection 
with keeping the reserves (Cheung & Sengupta, 2010: 
12). On the other hand, Levy-Yeyati proves that an 
increase in the reserves by one percentage point low-
ers the costs connected with the financing of external 
debt by 0.5 percentage point. In this case, the reserves 
are treated as a form of indirect security on the loan 
granted, which makes it possible to reduce the risk bo-
nus - expected by investors financing a given country’s 
debt (Akdogan, 2010:5). 
The data presented above make it possible to con-
clude that the level of reserves, which are currently 
kept by numerous countries, considerably exceeds the 
indexes  regarded  as  optimal.  Considerable  alterna-
tive costs connected with the possession of excessive 
reserves  make  it  necessary  to  manage  the  reserves 
held by the individual countries in a more effective 
way than before. It becomes possible owing to the ap-
plication of innovative investment tools, i.e. sovereign 
wealth funds.
4.  Sovereign  Wealth  Funds  as  Tools 
of Effective Management of Excessive 
Foreign Exchange Reserves
Sovereign wealth funds are defined as special invest-
ment funds created by a state or state-owned entities 
with the main task consisting in long-term asset in-
vestment  outside  the  given  country  (IMF,  2007:45). 
Two  basic  sources  of  funds,  which  are  available  to 
these entities, are revenues from the sales of natural 
resources and surpluses achieved in trade exchange. 
These funds are a relatively new phenomenon in the 
world’s  economy.  Their  greatest  development  took 
place in the years 2000-2010, where half of the 50 larg-
est funds of this type were established. The remaining 
funds were established in the years 1990-1999 (17%) 
and  before  the  year  1990  (27%)(IFSL,  2011:4).  The 
establishment  and  development  of  sovereign  wealth 
funds were discussed in D. Urban’s article, “Sovereign 
wealth funds – a new challenge for corporate supervi-
sion” (Urban, 2010: 40-43). At present, this category 
of investment entities encompasses 53 funds (www.
swfinstitute.org, of 25.06.2011), most of which comes 
from Asia and the Near East 37% and 36% respectively 
(IFSL, 2011:4). The data presented in the latest study 
by Monitor Group show that the most direct invest-
ments of these funds were connected with the financial 
sector, over 60% of which took place in BRIC coun-
tries, while 35% in OECD countries (Monitor Group, 
2011:12-17).  Fundamental  macroeconomic  benefits 
for a country with such funds will be presented below.
The consequences of a capital inflow to the economy 
(exceeding the outflow stream or exceeding the econ-
omy’s absorption capabilities) are a commonly known 
issue.  They  generally  include:  inflation,  speculative 
bubbles,  appreciation  of  the  foreign  exchange  rate, 
excess  liquidity  and  imbalance  of  the  financial  sec-
tor. This forces the country’s monetary authorities to 
take neutralising/sterilising actions. Thus, the growing 
stream of capital inflow makes it necessary to intervene 
on a larger scale, which, in turn, is conditioned by hav-
ing larger and larger reserves, which can be used for 
sterilisation.  The emergence of sovereign wealth funds 
has created an alternative possibility of managing the 
inflowing capital stream.  Thus, it became possible to 
transfer capital abroad and to allocate it to foreign as-
sets and not by means of intervening in the domestic 
monetary market. There are two kinds of benefits from 
this activity. Firstly, a similar goal as in the case of 
domestic sterilisation can be achieved – i.e. inflation 
prevention and prevention of speculative bubbles as 
well as being able to keep the competitiveness of the 
economy, owing to the foreign exchange rate stabilisa-
tion. Secondly, foreign sterilisation, which is possible 
owing to the existence of sovereign wealth funds, al-
lows for allocation of domestic capital to assets with 
a higher return rate. According to Areaza, Castilla & 
Fernandez, sovereign wealth funds are an alternative 
to sterilisation implemented by monetary authorities. 
Prevention of negative consequences of capital inflow 
is possible by, among other things, foreign exchange 
interventions, changes of mandatory reserves in banks 
or taxing the inflowing capital.  Such activities are al-
ways costly and difficult to perform in the long run 
(Areaza, Castilla & Fernandez, 2009: 26). 
As presented in the study by the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF, 2008: 4), sovereign wealth funds offer 
numerous financial and economic benefits for the found-
ing countries. These include facilitation connected with Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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inter-generation transfer of savings from income obtained 
from the sales of non-renewable natural resources as well 
as  the  possibility  of  preventing  economic  fluctuations 
caused by changes in the prices of export goods. They 
prevent greater diversification of the investment portfolio 
and the focus on the return rate, thus reducing or even 
eliminating the alternative costs connected with keeping 
the reserves.  The investment activity of sovereign wealth 
funds means safe and responsible asset management for 
countries with a high level of reserves.
Sovereign wealth funds established in recent years 
mostly come from developing countries and emerging 
markets. These countries have achieved a high rate of 
economic growth during the period of increasing oil 
prices  and  have  experienced  considerable  capital  in-
flow, which has allowed them to accumulate consider-
able foreign exchange reserves.  Due to the low market 
return rate, they were forced to allocate these reserves 
to an alternative group of investment tools, which made 
it possible for them to extend the existing investment 
portfolio to include new groups of assets.  Apart from 
investing reserves assuming a higher return rate than 
before, sovereign wealth funds can be also used as a 
form of security in the event of shocks, which could af-
fect the sectors responsible for manufacturing of goods 
and  exports.  This  is  achieved  by  investing  in  assets, 
whose return rate is negatively correlated with the re-
turn rate of assets with risks regarded as the basic risk a 
given country is exposed to (Lam & Rossi, 2010: 305).
De Larosière proved that a low return rate in finan-
cial markets was the result of permanent recirculation 
of surpluses generated by trade based on undervalued 
currencies and imports of resources from developing 
countries and emerging markets. These countries allo-
cated their surpluses to US securities and other assets 
with similar risk, which resulted in lower profitability 
of these securities. Under the conditions of common 
liquidity  with  simultaneous  low  profitability,  inves-
tors actively searched for a higher return rate (De La-
rosière, 2009: 7). Sovereign wealth funds became a way 
of ensuring higher profitability of invested assets.  The 
view that an investment strategy aimed at the achieve-
ment of a higher return rate and higher risk connected 
with it was partially inevitable can also be encountered 
in the literature on these entities. This was caused by 
a growth of sovereign wealth funds and assets man-
aged by sovereign wealth funds, which was quicker 
than the rate of growth of assets regarded as the tradi-
tional source of allocating reserves, including securi-
ties issued by the United States, Great Britain and euro 
countries (Areaza, Castilla & Fernandez, 2009: 32). 
Research  conducted  by  Deutsche  Bank  (Deutsche 
Bank, 2007: 5) showed that the actual return rate on in-
vestment in government securities has been approx. 1% 
over the past 60 years. In the case of portfolio consisting 
of 60% shares and 40% government securities, the return 
rate was approx. 6%. High likelihood of dollar devalua-
tion with the simultaneous near-zero level of percentage 
rates in the American market may cause purchases of US 
dollar denominated debt securities to become an even 
less profitable investment strategy, which will probably 
result in an even greater interest in a different form of as-
set management offered by sovereign wealth funds. 
Ping & Chao proved that under the conditions of 
the present-day monetary system, the achievement of 
simultaneous stability of the exchange rate and keeping 
the purchase power of the reserves are possible only by 
creating a monetary union - as in the case of the Euro 
zone - or by management of the reserves by sovereign 
wealth funds for the whole group of countries, whose 
currencies are not the reserve currency. Taking into 
consideration the length of the process of monetary 
union establishment, which requires the coordination 
of the expectations of all the participants, the estab-
lishment of sovereign wealth funds becomes a far more 
practical solution (Ping & Chao, 2009: 12).
As regards countries with considerable natural re-
sources and limited absorptive capabilities, the activity 
of these entities makes it possible to limit or completely 
eliminate the resource curse connected with it. Coun-
tries, such as Qatar or Kuwait, are incapable of allocating 
all their reserves in the domestic market in an effective 
manner as this might result in price disturbance and 
speculative bubbles (Cehajic, 2009: 18). Investment ac-
tivity for these countries can be conducted by using in-
stitutional innovations such as sovereign wealth funds. 
This makes it possible to access a broad range of assets 
in international markets with simultaneous fulfilment of 
the objectives of the national monetary policy. 
Conclusions
The aim of this study was to present economic con-
ditions  of  the  function  of  sovereign  wealth  funds. 
Original conditions encompass the specificity of the 52 D. Urban
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international foreign exchange system, which makes it 
necessary for the countries to hold considerable foreign 
exchange reserves. These reserves significantly exceed 
the indices considered to be optimal for the countries 
under analysis. It has been shown in the article that 
sovereign wealth funds can be an alternative form of 
foreign exchange reserve management.
The analysis conducted in this article proves that the 
development of institutional entities called sovereign 
wealth funds is determined by economic factors. In the 
first place, they include the necessity of managing the 
inflowing capital to prevent it from causing negative 
consequences for the economy in the form of excess li-
quidity, speculation and foreign exchange rate appreci-
ation. Secondly, the objectives of these entities include 
the minimisation of the alternative cost resulting from 
holding considerable capital by transferring it to other 
assets ensuring the highest possible return rate.
It also needs to be underlined that the architecture 
of the global finance in its current condition will prob-
ably continue to generate global imbalance, which will 
result in a further increase in the level of foreign ex-
change reserves accompanied by a growing interest in 
alternative forms of investing these reserves. Sovereign 
wealth funds are innovative tools in this area. Their ac-
tivity makes it necessary to redefine the existing para-
digms concerning the allocation of foreign exchange 
reserves. These entities can be treated as specific sub-
stitutes for national monetary authorities, supporting 
central banks in the achievement of monetary goals 
in the domestic markets, and, on the other hand, as 
important entities of the global financial market, the 
operation of which ensures the countries of their ori-
gin an effective way of managing excessive foreign ex-
change reserves. 
References
1.  Aizenman, J., Lee, J. (2007). International reserves: 
Precautionary versus mercantilist view, hypothesis 
and evidence, Open Economies Review, 18(2), 191-
214.
2.  Akdogan, K. (2010). Foreign exchange reserves in 
a credit-constrained economy. Birkbeck Working 
Papers in Economics & Finance, 1014.
3.  Alfaro, L. & Kanchuk, F. (2009). Optimal reserve 
management and sovereign debt. Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 77(1), 23-36.
4.  Areaza, A., Castilla, L. & Fernandez C. (2009). 
The  coming  of  age  of  sovereign  wealth  funds: 
Perspectives  and  policy  issues  within  and  be-
yond borders. Global Journal of Emerging Market 
Economies, 1(1), 25-41.
5.  Beck, R. & Fidora M. (2008). The Impact of Sover-
eign Wealth Funds on Global Financial Markets. 
ECB Occasional Paper Series, No.91.
6.  Cehajic, S. (2009). Sovereign Wealth Funds: Con-
tingent Risks and a Laissez-Faire Approach Com-
plemented With a“Just-in-Case” Reactive Regula-
tory Framework. (October 1, 2009). Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1494291
7.  Cheung, Y.W. & Qian, X. (2009). Hoarding of In-
ternational  Reserves:  Mrs  Machlup`s  Wardrobe 
and the Joneses. Review of International Econom-
ics, 17(4), 824-843.
8.  Cheung, Y.W. & Sengupta R. (2010). Accumula-
tion of reserves and keeping up with the Joneses: 
The case of LATAM economies. International Re-
view of Economics and Finance, 20(1), 19-31.
9.  Costabile, L. (2009). Current global imbalances and 
the Keynes Plan. A Keynesian approach for reform-
ing the international monetary system. Structural 
Change and Economic Dynamics, 20(2), 78-89.
10.  D`Arista,  J.  (2009).  The  evolving  international 
monetary system. Cambridge Journal of Econom-
ics, 33(4), 531-538.
11.  De  Larosière,  J.  (2009).  Report  of  the  High-Level 
Group on Financial Supervision in the EU. Brussels: 
The de Larosière Group.
12.  Deutsche Bank. (2007). Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
State Investments on the Rise. 
13.  Dooley,  M.,  Folkerts-Landau,  D.  &  Garber  P. 
(2009). Bretton Woods II Still Defines the Inter-
national Monetary Sytem. NBER Working Paper, 
14731.
14.  Dooley,  M.,  Folkerts-Landau,  D.  &  Garber  P. 
(2004). The revived Bretton Woods system. Inter-
national Journal of Finance and Economics, 9, 307-
313.
15.  Durdu,  C.B.,  Mendoza  E.G.  &  Terrones  M.E. 
(2009). Precautionary demand for foreign assets 
in sudden-stop economies: An assessment  of the 
new  mercantilism.  Journal  of  Development  Eco-
nomics, 89(2), 194-209.
16.  Eichengreen,  B.  &  Raco-Garcia  R.  (2006).  The Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
53 Macroeconomic Considerations and Motives of Sovereign Wealth Funds Activity
evolution  of  exchange  rates  regimes.  Economic 
Policy. 
17.  Green, R. & Torgerson T. (2007). Are High Foreign 
Exchange Reserves in Emerging Markets a Blessing 
or a Burden? Department of Treasury: Office of In-
ternational Affairs, Occasional Paper No.6.
18.  Griffith-Jones, S. & Ocampo, J.A. (2010). Sovereign 
Wealth Funds. A Developing Country Perspective. 
Brussels:  Foundation  for  European  Progressive 
Studies .
19.  Hall, S., Hondroyiannis, G., Swamy, P. & Tavlas, G. 
(2009). Bretton-Woods System, Old and New, and 
the Rotation of Exchange-Rates Regimes. Univer-
sity of Leicester, Working Paper No.09/15.
20.  Hutchison, M., Noy, I. & Wang, L. (2010). Fiscal 
and monetary policies and the costs of sudden-stop. 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 29(6), 
973-987.
21.  IFSL. (2011). Sovereign Wealth Funds.
22.  IMF.  (2008).  Sovereign  Wealth  Funds  -  A  Work 
Agenda.
23.  IMF. (2007). Global Financial Stability Report, Fi-
nancial Market Turbulence. Causes, Consequences 
and Policies.
24.  Lam, R.W. & Rossi M. (2010) Sovereign wealth 
funds – investment strategies and financial dis-
tress. Journal of Derivatives & Hedge Funds, 15(4), 
304-322.
25.  Machlup, F. (1966). The Need for Monetary Re-
serves, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Re-
view, 5875.
26.  Mateos y Lago, I., Duttagupta, R., Goyal, R. (2009). 
The  Debate  on  International  Monetary  System.  
IMF Stuff Position Note, SPN/09/26.
27.  Monitor Group (2011). Braving the New World: 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the Uncertain 
Times of 2010. 
28.  Nędzyński,  K.  (2003).  Rola  złota  w  polityce 
pieniężnej. Teoria monetarna w modelu ekonomii 
podaży, Materiały i Studia. Zeszyt 168. Warsaw: 
Narodowy Bank Polski.
29.  Ping, X. & Chao, C. (2009). The Theoretical Logic 
of  Sovereign  Wealth  Funds.  Social  Science  Re-
search Network.
30.  Urban, D. (2010). Państwowe fundusze majątkowe-
nowe  wyzwanie  dla  nadzoru  korporacyjnego, 
Contemporary Economics, 4(3), 39-48 .
31.  Visco, I. (2010). Global Imbalances, Financial Cri-
sis and the International Monetary System. World 
Economics, (11)(1), 69-82.
32.  The World Bank Group. (2010.11.15). Retrieved 
from: www.worldbank.org
33.  Sovereign Wealth Funds Institute. (11.06.25).  Re-
trieved from: www.swfinstitute.org